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In practical quantum key distribution (QKD), weak coherent states as the photon source have a
limit in secure key rate and transmission distance because of the existence of multiphoton pulses and
heavy loss in transmission line. The decoy-state method and the nonorthogonal encoding protocol
are two important weapons to combat these effects. Here, we combine these two methods and
propose an efficient method that can substantially improve the performance of QKD. We find a
78 km increase over the prior record using the decoy-state method and a 123 km increase over the
result of the SARG04 protocol in transmission distance.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2] allows two
users, Alice and Bob, to communicate in absolute secu-
rity in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Unlike con-
ventional cryptography, the security of QKD is based on
the uncertainty principle and the noncloning theorem [3].
In other words, the measurement of an unknown quan-
tum state modifies the state itself. Thus, Eve cannot gain
any information on the key without introducing any error
in the correlations between Alice and Bob. However, in
practical implementations, an attenuated laser pulse (a
weak coherent state)is often used as the source. The ex-
istence of multiple photon pulses, even though very rare,
poses a serious problem for the security of the protocol,
especially in high lossy channel. An eavesdropper (Eve)
can in principle have the full information of Bob’s sifted
key by using the photon-number-splitting (PNS)attack
[4, 5, 6]: Eve blocks all single-photon pulses and part of
multi-photon pulses and separates each of the remained
multi-photon pulses into two parts therefore each part
contains at least one photon. She keeps one part and
sends the other part to Bob, through a lossless channel.
Recently, two important methods have been proposed
to overcome PNS attacks. One is the decoy-state method
firstly proposed by Hwang [7], and further studied by
Wang [8], and also Lo and co-workers [9, 10]. Partic-
ularly, by combining the idea of the entanglement dis-
tillation approach by Gottesman, Lo, Lutkenhaus, and
Preskill (GLLP) [11] with the decoy state method, they
achieved a formula for secure key generation rate [9]:
S ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (1)
where q is the sifting efficiency depending on the imple-
mentation (1/2 for the BB84 protocol, because half the
time Alice and Bob bases are not compatible), Qµ and
Eµ are the gain (i.e., counting rate [8]) and quantum bit
error rate (QBER) of the signal state respectively, and
can be measured directly, Q1 and e1 are the gain and
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QBER of single-photon states respectively, and can be es-
timated by using decoy state method, f(Eµ) is the error
correction efficiency [12], and H2 is the binary Shannon
entropy, given by:
H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1− x) log2(1− x). (2)
The other is the nonorthogonal states encoding protocol
proposed by Scarani, Acin, Ribordy and Gisin (SARG04)
[13], which uses exactly the same four states as in BB84
[2], and only the classical sifting procedure is different
from BB84: instead of revealing the basis, Alice an-
nounces publicly a pair of nonorthogonal states. Thus,
Eve needs at least three photons to obtain full informa-
tion. This means one can utilize the two-photon part to
generate a secure key. However, either the decoy state
method or the nonorthogonal states encode protocol has
no further security analysis on it.
In this paper, we first present a simple method that can
study the secure key generation rate when single-photon
and two-photon pulses are employed to generate secure
key. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we
derive a formula for secure key generation rate, where
two-photon part is included. Next we present a simple
method that will give a tight bound to Q0, Q1, e1, Q2
(the gain of two-photon states)and e2 (the error rate of
two-photon states) respectively. Then we present the ad-
vantage of this new protocol at secure key generation rate
and transmission distance by comparing with the results
in [9]. Finally, we discuss and conclude.
Our new GLLP formula. The secure generation rate
must include the two-photon part when we use SARG04
protocol. So we need to modify Eq. (1) to satisfy our
purpose.
Theorem The key generation of an nonorthogonal en-
coding scheme is given by:
S ≥ q{−QµH2(Eµ)+Q0+Q1[1−H2(e1)]+Q2[1−H2(e2)]},
(3)
where q is 1/4 for SARG04, and Q0 is the gain of the
vacuum signals.
Now, let us prove it. According to the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
theorem [14]: if the mutual information Alice-Bob is
2larger than either the mutual information Alice-Eve or
Bob-Eve, then Alice and Bob can distil a secret key. The
secure key generation in QKD satisfies
S ≥ I(A : B)− I(B : E), (4)
where I(A : B) and I(B : E) are mutual information of
Alice-Bob and Bob-Eve respectively, and are given by:
I(A : B) = qQµ(1−H2(Eµ)) (5)
I(B : E) = q{Q1H2(e1) +Q2H2(e2) +
∑
n≥3
Qn}, (6)
where Qn is the gain of n-photon states, and q is 1/4
for SARG04. The vacuum signals do not contribute to it
at all because of the mutual information of vacuum be-
ing zero. Here, we take the most conservative assumption
that Eve has all the information on all tagged pulses (the
parts for photon number n ≥ 3) and obtains full informa-
tion stemming from the QBERs e1 and e2. Combining
Eq. (4) and Qµ =
∑
n≥0Qn, we get the result of our
theorem. In fact Eq. (3) can be generalized from Lo’s
theorem [15] directly if only adding the secure generation
rate of the two-photon part. As discussed in [9], practical
error correction protocols are generally inefficient. Thus,
the secure key generation rate for practical protocols is
given by:
S ≥ q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q0 +Q1[1−H2(e1)]
+Q2[1−H2(e2)]}. (7)
The optimal secure key generation rate without decoy
states. Although we have obtained the Eq. (7) that can
calculate the secure key generation rate for the SARG04
protocol, we have to discard the it due to the presence of
Eve. In this case, Eve can block all single-photon pulses
or all two-photon pulses, she can get more information,
so the worst secure key generation rate is given by
Sworst =
1
4
(−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ)+Q0+ΩQµ[1−H2( e
Ω
)]),
(8)
where f(Eµ) = 1 for convenience, and Ω, the fraction of
untagged photons, satisfies
Ω = 1− (1 + µ+ µ
2/2)e−µ
Qµ
. (9)
Sworst is optimised if we choose µ = µoptimal, which ful-
fills
ηe−ηµoptimal =
1
2
µ2optimale
−µoptimal . (10)
Since for realistic setup we expect that η ≪ 1, we find
µoptimal ≈
√
2η.
The lower bound of the secure key generation rate with
decoy states. A verified lower bound of secure key gener-
ation rate can be obtained by using decoy-state method.
This method is dependent on the real-world QKD pro-
tocols deeply. In practical implementations, a weak co-
herent state (i.e., a dephased coherent state) is a mixed
state of
ρ =
∫
dθ
2pi
|√µeiθ〉〈√µeiθ| =
∑
n
Pn(µ)|µ〉〈µ|, (11)
where Pn(µ) =
µne−µ
n!
and µ is the mean photon number.
The gain, Qµ, and QBER, Eµ, are given by
Qµ =
∑
n≥0
Qn (12)
QµEµ =
∑
n≥0
Qnen (13)
and Qn = YnPn(µ), where en and Yn are respectively the
error rate and yield of the n-photon state. In the normal
case that there is no eavesdropper, Qµ and Eµ are given
by [10]:
Qµ = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ, (14)
QµEµ = e0Y0 + edet(1 − e−ηµ), (15)
where edet is the probability that a photon hit the erro-
neous detector, η is the overall transmission probability
of a photon.
In the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, we can use the
decoy-state method to detect Eve’s attacks. The essence
of decoy state idea is that Eve cannot distinguish the de-
coy state from the signal state. So the signal state and
the decoy state have the same values for the yield, Yn,
and QBER, en. In order to achieve the unconditional se-
curity of QKD with the key generation rate given by Eq.
(7), we must consider now how to use the decoy state
idea to estimate Q0, Q1, e1, Q2 and e2. A similar prob-
lem for orthogonal encoding protocols has been analyzed
explicitly by Lo and his co-workers in [10]. Here we ex-
ploit their method to solve the question in nonorthogonal
protocols.
For simplicity, we propose a specific protocol that uses
only four decoy states: vacuum and three weak decoy
states. The vacuum can be used to estimate the back-
ground rate,
Y0 = Qvacuum,
e0 = Evacuum =
1
2
. (16)
The dark counts occur randomly; thus the error rate of
the the dark count is 1/2. The signal and three decoy
states with expected numbers µ, ν1, ν2 and ν3 satisfy
0 < ν3 < ν2 ≤ 2
3
µ < ν1 ≤ 3
4
µ,
ν1 + ν2 > µ,
ν2 + ν3 < µ. (17)
3Alice and Bob will get the following gains and QBERs
for signal state and these three decoy states:
Qµe
µ = Y0 + Y1µ+
Y2µ
2
2
+
∞∑
i=3
Yi
µi
i!
,
EµQµe
µ = e0Y0 + e1Y1µ+
e2Y2µ
2
2
+
∞∑
i=3
eiYi
µi
i!
,
Qν1e
ν1 = Y0 + Y1ν1 +
Y2ν
2
1
2
+
∞∑
i=3
Yi
νi1
i!
,
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 = e0Y0 + e1Y1ν1 +
e2Y2ν
2
1
2
+
∞∑
i=3
eiYi
νi1
i!
,
Qν2e
ν2 = Y0 + Y1ν2 +
Y2ν
2
2
2
+
∞∑
i=3
Yi
νi2
i!
,
Eν2Qν2e
ν2 = e0Y0 + e1Y1ν2 +
e2Y2ν
2
2
2
+
∞∑
i=3
eiYi
νi2
i!
,
Qν3e
ν3 = Y0 + Y1ν3 +
Y2ν
2
3
2
+
∞∑
i=3
Yi
νi3
i!
,
Eν3Qν3e
ν3 = e0Y0 + e1Y1ν3 +
e2Y2ν
2
3
2
+
∞∑
i=3
eiYi
νi3
i!
.
(18)
Alice and Bob can estimate the lower bound of Y1 and
the upper bound of e1 from Eq. (18) by using decoy
states ν2 and ν3 . The lower bound of Y1 is given by
Qν2e
ν2 −Qν3eν3 = Y1(ν2 − ν3) +
∑
i≥2
Yi
i!
(νi2 − νi3)
≤ Y1(ν2 − ν3) + ν
2
2
−ν2
3
µ2
∑
i≥2
Yiµ
i
i!
= Y1(ν2 − ν3) + ν
2
2
−ν2
3
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y1µ). (19)
Here,in order to prove the inequality in Eq. (19), we
have made use of the inequality that ai − bi ≤ a2 − b2
whenever 0 < b < a ≤ 2
3
, and i ≥ 2. The last equality
sign holds in the in Eq. (19) if and only if Eve raises the
yield of two-photon states and blocks all the states with
photon number greater than 2. In fact Eve will not take
this tactics because she cannot achieve full information
on two-photon state. The upper bound of e1 is given by
Eν3Qν3e
ν3 = e0Y0 + e1Y1ν3 +
∑∞
i=2 eiYi
νi
3
i!
≥ e0Y0 + e1Y1ν3. (20)
By solving Eq. (19) and Eq. (20), the lower bound of Y1
and upper bound of e1 are given by
Y1 ≥ Y L1
=
µ2(Qν2e
ν2 −Qν3eν3)− (ν22 − ν23 )(Qµeµ − Y0)
µ2(ν2 − ν3)(µ− ν2 − ν3) ,
e1 ≤ eU1 =
Eν3Qν3e
ν3 − e0Y0
Y L
1
ν3
. (21)
Then, according Q1 = Y1P1(µ), the gain of single-photon
states is given by
Q1 ≥ QL1 = Y L1 µe−µ. (22)
Next, Alice and Bob can estimate the lower bounds of
Y2 and the upper bound of e2 respectively by using decoy
states ν1, ν2 and ν3 from Eq. (18) under conditions Eq.
(17). The lower bound of Y2 is given by
Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2eν2
= Y1(ν1 − ν2) + Y22 (ν21 − ν22 ) +
∑
i≥3
Yi
i!
(νi1 − νi2)
≤ Y1(ν1 − ν2) + Y22 (ν21 − ν22) +
ν3
1
−ν3
2
µ3
∑
i≥3
Yiµ
i
i!
= Y1(ν1 − ν2) + Y22 (ν21 − ν22)
+
ν3
1
−ν3
2
µ3
∑
i≥3(Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y1µ− Y2µ
2
2
)
= Y2
2
(ν21 − ν22 ) + ν
3
1
−ν3
2
µ3
∑
i≥3(Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y2µ
2
2
).(23)
In order to prove the inequality in Eq. (23), we have
made use of the inequality that ai−bi ≤ a2−b2 whenever
0 < b < a ≤ 3
4
, and i ≥ 3. The last equality sign
holds in Eq. (23) if and only if Eve raises the yield of
three-photon states and blocks all the states with photon
number greater than 3. In addition, to obtain the last
sign equality in Eq. (23), we have let ν1 and ν2 satisfying
ν1 − ν2 − ν
3
1 − ν31
µ2
= 0. (24)
The upper bound of e2 is given by
Eν3Qν3e
ν3 = e0Y0 + e1Y1ν3 +
e2Y2ν
2
3
2
+
∑∞
i=3 eiYi
νi
3
i!
≥ e0Y0 + e2Y2ν
2
3
2
. (25)
By solving Eq. (23) and Eq. (25), the lower bound of Y2
and Q2 and upper bound of e2 are given by
Y2 ≥ Y L2
=
2µ(Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2eν2)− 2(ν1 − ν2)(Qµeµ − Y0)
µ(ν1 − ν2)(ν1 + ν2 − µ) ,
Q2 ≥ QL2 =
Y L2 µ
2e−µ
2
,
e2 ≤ eU2 =
2Eν3Qν3e
ν3 − 2e0Y0
Y L
2
ν2
3
. (26)
Now, the lower bound of the secure key generation rate,
according to Eq. (7), is given by:
SL = q{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q0 +QL1 [1−H2(eU1 )]
+QL2 [1−H2(eU2 )]},(27)
where Q0 = Y0e
−µ = Qvacuume
−µ. Comparing our re-
sult (given in Eq. (7)) with the prior result in [10](given
in Eq. (1)), we see that the main difference is that in our
result, two additional terms, Q0 and Q
L
2 [1−H2(eU2 )], can
also generate secure keys. To fix the ideas, we will com-
pare our protocol with the SARG04 protocol and BB84
protocol according Eqs. (7) (8) and (1) respectively in
the following paragraph.
For simplicity, We only consider the asymptotic case
(i.e. omit statical fluctuations of Qn and en). By using
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FIG. 1: (a)The optimal secure generation rate for SARG04
protocol without decoy states, (b)The optimal secure gener-
ation rate for BB84 protocol with decoy states (µ = 0.48),
(c) The secure generation rate for our protocol by using the
formula (27)(µ = 0.48), (d) The secure generation rate for
our protocol by using the formula (27) (µ = 0.30). The pa-
rameters is given according to experiment GYS [16]: α =
0.21dB/km, edet = 3.3%, Y0 = 1.7× 10
−6, and the detection
efficiency of Bob’s setup ηBob = 0.045. f(Eµ) = 1.22.
the GYS [16] experiment as an example, the result shows
in Fig. 1. The curve (a) is the optimal secure generation
rate for SARG04 protocol without decoy states achieved
by using Eq. (8). The curve (b) is a simple repeat of Ref.
[9] for BB84 protocol with decoy states. We note that our
protocol is better than both SARG04 protocol without
decoy states and Lo’s protocol at any distance. The max-
imal distances of the three protocols are 220, 142, and 97
km respectively. Theoretically, we can achieve a longer
transmission distance with our method when we decrease
the value of µ. In these cases, however, the weak decoy
state method cannot work efficiently due to the statical
fluctuations.
In summary, we have proposed an efficient and feasible
nonorthogonal decoy-state protocol to do QKD over very
lossy channel. we have clearly demonstrated how to es-
timate the lower bound of the secure key generation rate
in this new protocol. Our result shows that, the combi-
nation of decoy state method and nonorthogonal states
encoding protocol can make great progress at the secure
key generation rate. Our protocol can be realized easily
because it is the same as Lo’s protocol in operation.
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